Where does your program stand?
U.S. Division I athletic programs operate at radically different scales — and depend on radically different revenue mixes — even within the same conference tier. This site covers 360 D1 programs in the FY 2024-25 dataset; analytical coverage varies by what each program discloses (see Coverage Gaps). FY 2024-25 was the transitional year: the House v. NCAA settlement was approved in October 2024; the $20.5M revenue-sharing cap took effect July 1, 2025. This dataset captures that moment. Each school's record carries its structural-divide category from the parent framework at Mapping the Structural Divide, which keys the dot colors on the chart views.
Data current to FY 2024-25 · Updated as new fiscal years become available
School Name
The Whole D1
D1 programs mapped on athletic revenue and self-generated revenue share. The chart shows the 200 institutions with full MFRS line-item disclosure; the remaining 160 of 360 in the dataset have EADA top-line totals only — see Coverage Gaps for the institutional pattern. Filter by tier or scope; click any dot for the school's detail card.
X-axis: Total Athletic Revenue
How big is the athletic enterprise in absolute dollars?
Y-axis: Self-Generated Revenue Share
What share of athletic revenue is earned externally, not from the institution itself?
Reading the dots: position is athletic, color is not
The X and Y axes above are athletic-finance metrics. Dot color is independent of those metrics. It encodes each institution's structural-divide category from the parent framework at Mapping the Structural Divide — a separate institution-level classification built from IPEDS, College Scorecard, O*NET/Anthropic Economic Index, and WICHE data. Two schools at the same point on the chart can be different colors, and two schools the same color can be far apart on the chart.
Dot shape encodes D1 tier: ● Power 4 · ■ Group of 5 · ▲ FCS-tier.
About the conference highlight. When a conference is selected, matching schools render at full opacity and the rest dim for context, so peer comparisons stay visible. A school matches if its football or basketball conference equals the selection — split-conference cases (Notre Dame, UConn, Hawaii, Pioneer-League football schools) appear under either tag. Selecting an FCS-tier or non-football conference automatically relaxes the Scope filter to All D1 so matching schools become visible. Some conferences will show fewer schools — or none — because the chart only plots institutions with full MFRS line-item disclosure. See the Coverage Gaps tab for which institutions are missing and why.
Dashed lines mark medians of the current selection. Click any dot for the school's detail card.
Programs in the upper right earn most of their revenue from external sources (media, donors, ticket sales) and operate at large scale — the self-sustaining commercial athletics model that characterizes the top of the Power Four. Programs in the lower left operate at smaller revenue scale and rely heavily on allocated revenue (student fees, direct institutional support, state appropriations) — the structural majority of G5 and FCS-tier athletics. Colors show each program's position in the Structural Divide framework (institutional resilience × post-college market position).
The chart reveals two stories. First: athletics finance is dominated by conference tier. Power Four programs operate at $130-350M revenue and 0-15% allocated share; Group of Five at $30-100M and 50-60% allocated; FCS-tier at $5-50M and 70-80% allocated. Second: within those tiers, structural-divide position predicts the outliers. The few P4 programs not in High Capacity, the G5 programs varying by structural position, the FCS programs whose institutional commitment to athletics consumes nearly half the entire institutional budget — those are the cases where this site does its analytical work.
By Sport
Athletic revenue and expense broken into four buckets — Men's Football, Men's Basketball, Women's Basketball, and Other (which combines all non-marquee sports with institutional overhead not allocated to a specific team). The shape of the bars is the structural-divide argument made empirical: football is what makes P4 athletics self-sustaining; without it, the picture flattens.
Shares are computed as the mean of per-school sport-bucket shares within each tier, restricted to programs that field football and report sport-level breakdowns (P4 n=52, G5 n=58, FCS n=56; 166 schools total). Non-football D1 schools are excluded from this view. "Other" combines non-marquee sports revenue/expense with institutional overhead not allocated to specific teams.
A note on the "football brings in 80% of revenue" framing common in college sports commentary: under MFRS sport-attribution conventions, conference media distributions, NCAA distributions, and most unrestricted donor contributions are reported in the Other bucket — not in Football — even though they are functionally football-downstream at P4 programs. Adding MFB and Other together at P4 yields 88.1% across all P4 schools and roughly 89% at the top-20 P4. The 46.5% MFB figure is the narrower direct-attribution accounting; the ~88% is the broader "football economy." Both are accurate; they answer different questions. See Methods for a full treatment.
Women's basketball is a cost center at every tier — even at the top.
WBB generates 1–4% of athletic revenue but consumes 4–7% of expense across all three tiers. The most-followed WBB programs — those whose ascent the media has been tracking through the Caitlin Clark and Paige Bueckers eras — generate meaningful revenue but run material annual deficits on women's basketball alone:
Revenue has grown meaningfully at the top of the sport over the past three years. Expense has grown faster. WBB hasn't joined football and men's basketball as a self-sustaining sport at any program in the FY 2024-25 dataset.
Football revenue dominance is the P4 advantage. P4 schools draw 46.5% of athletic revenue from football. G5 schools draw 21.9%. FCS-tier schools draw 19.8%. Take football revenue away and P4 athletics looks like G5 athletics — the structural difference between the haves and have-nots is not that P4 schools have more athletic revenue. It's that P4 schools have football revenue, and football revenue is what makes athletics self-sustaining at this scale.
G5 and FCS athletics are not revenue-generating enterprises in the way "college sports" is typically discussed. Over 70% of athletic revenue at G5 and FCS schools comes from the Other bucket — a mix of institutional support, NCAA distributions, conference distributions, and the modest revenue produced by non-marquee sports. Less than 30% of athletic revenue at these schools is generated by sport activity in any meaningful market sense. The dominant funding mechanism is the institution itself, not the games. This is the empirical anchor for the Olson framing of college athletics as a coordination-equilibrium subsidy regime: the schools paying the most to maintain the front porch are the schools whose front porch generates the least.
The expense side tells a more uniform story than the revenue side. Football consumes 22-30% of athletic expense across all three tiers; basketball is 8-9% everywhere; WBB is 4-7%. The variance that shows up on the revenue side largely disappears on the expense side, which means the gap between tiers is not a function of different cost structures — it's a function of who can monetize what they've built. G5 schools spend on football at nearly the same proportional rate as P4 (30.2% vs 28.5% of athletic expense) but draw a fraction of the football revenue (21.9% vs 46.5% of athletic revenue). The arms race is being run with the same intensity at every tier; only some tiers get paid for running it.
The Coaching Arms Race, by the Numbers
Head coach compensation as a share of each sport's total program expense. The headline number is the basketball coach concentration: across all three D1 tiers, the men's basketball head coach consumes roughly twice the proportional share of program expense that the football head coach does. Inside the P4, that ratio rises to a single-coach-dominated economic activity.
Head coach figures are total annual compensation as reported in NCAA Membership Financial Reports (MFRS line items 22a, 22b, 22c). Shares are means of per-school HC%-of-sport-expense within each tier, restricted to programs reporting head coach compensation and non-zero sport expense (MFB n=128 / MBB n=151 / WBB n=151).
The top of men's basketball is a head-coach-dominated economic activity.
At a dozen P4 and G5 programs, the head men's basketball coach earns more than 37% of the entire MBB program budget. Bill Self at Kansas earns 48.9% of his program's annual basketball expense — almost half of the budget on a single line item.
For comparison: the highest-paid head football coach in FY 2024-25, Kirby Smart at Georgia, earns $13.57M — 19.1% of Georgia's football program expense. The absolute football number is bigger; the proportional basketball numbers are extreme.
Basketball head coaches consume roughly twice the proportional share football coaches do. Across the P4, the men's basketball head coach averages 30.4% of program expense; the football head coach averages 14.5%. The same pattern repeats at G5 (22.2% MBB, 8.5% MFB) and FCS (19.4% MBB, 7.4% MFB). The mechanical explanation is that basketball has smaller rosters, smaller scholarship pools, smaller assistant-coaching staffs, and lower facility-overhead costs, so the head coach is a larger fraction of a smaller pie. The substantive read is that men's basketball at the top tier is, increasingly, a single-coach economic activity in a way football is not.
The arms race is real, and it's also one slice of a much larger picture. Combined, the three named head coaches — football, men's basketball, women's basketball — consume 7.4% of total athletic expense at P4 programs. That's $13.3M on average for three people on a ~$180M average athletic budget. The dollars are enormous in absolute terms. They are not, however, where most of the athletic dollar goes. The remaining 92.6% funds assistant coaches, support staff, scholarships, recruiting, travel, facilities, debt service, conference distributions, and the dozens of non-revenue sports the institution maintains. Reform debate that fixates on head coach contracts as a primary lever for fiscal restraint is reading the budget at the wrong scale.
Women's basketball coach concentration tracks the men's pattern, in proportion. WBB head coaches average 17.1% of WBB expense at P4 — comparable to MFB at the same tier (14.5%), and well below the MBB figure (30.4%). The smaller absolute compensation tracks the smaller absolute revenue and expense base. The gap between MBB and WBB head coach pay is not a coaching-market anomaly; it's the budget gap downstream of the revenue gap covered in the By Sport tab. Coaching markets clear against program budgets, and program budgets are what they are because of what the programs produce.
Coverage Gaps
Several structurally-meaningful D1 programs don't appear with complete financial data in this dataset. The gaps cluster by cause, and each one is a structural feature of how athletic finance disclosure works (or doesn't) in the U.S. — themselves analytical findings, not data-quality bugs.
Associated-entity workaround
UCF routes athletic operations through a separately incorporated entity that isn't subject to public records requests. The disclosure regime that exposes most public-D1 financial detail can't reach this structure. UCF appears in the dataset for EADA-reported revenue and expense totals but does not have MFRS line-item detail.
State public-records exemptions
Pittsburgh is exempt from Pennsylvania's open records law for athletic finances. Penn State has the same exemption but voluntarily released a partial filing for FY25.
Federal institution reporting
Army and Air Force service academies don't appear in EADA's database — federal institutions have a different reporting regime than civilian Title IV institutions. Navy entered the dataset with the May 2026 MFRS refresh; because Navy is federally funded rather than reported through IPEDS institutional finance, its athletics-share-of-institution metric isn't computed.
Consolidated state-system reporting
UCLA, UC Berkeley, UC Davis, UC Irvine, UC Riverside, UC San Diego, and UC Santa Barbara report institutional financials consolidated at the University of California system level rather than per-campus in IPEDS Finance. These schools appear in the dataset for athletic revenue and expense but cannot be normalized as athletics-share-of-institution.
Private-school MFRS unavailable
Private D1 institutions' NCAA Membership Financial Reports are not subject to public records requests. Notre Dame, Stanford, Duke, USC, Vanderbilt, Boston College, Northwestern, Syracuse, Wake Forest, TCU, BYU, Baylor, SMU, Miami-FL and others appear in the dataset for EADA-level total revenue and expense but without the MFRS line-item detail that public schools provide. Where conferences have arrangements with their member institutions to share reports voluntarily, that data may be available through other channels — but it does not appear in publicly-FOIA-able form.
Uneven MFRS access at remaining smaller publics
A residual set of public D1 institutions still have EADA-level totals but no MFRS line-item detail (an additional 123 private institutions lack MFRS by structure, since their reports aren't FOIA-able). Successive data refreshes have closed coverage at most MEAC institutions, a substantial fraction of the SWAC HBCUs, both Montana publics, Georgia Tech, Alabama and Florida, the Cal State Big West group, and the remaining MEAC and SWAC programs disclosed in the May 2026 refresh. The remaining short list of publics without MFRS line-item detail clusters in smaller-conference long tails — a handful of CAA non-football members, OVC, Big Sky, Southland, UAC, Horizon, and America East schools that file on slower cadences or operate under state-level public-records exemptions. The functional consequence is that for those remaining schools, the site can surface EADA top-line totals but not the allocated/self-generated split or sport-bucket breakdown that better-disclosed publics make available. This is itself a structural-divide finding: the disclosure regime — and therefore the accountability infrastructure — is not equally distributed across institution types. School cards for affected institutions carry a "Limited data" note.
Why this matters
The blind spots aren't accidents. Each one reflects a structural feature of how athletic finance disclosure works (or doesn't) in the U.S. — and where the disclosure regime ends, accountability ends with it. The schools and programs that operate in these gaps make policy and financial decisions that the public never sees.
Methods
Where the data comes from, how variables are defined, and which analytical choices were made. The standard is the same as the parent framework: describe what was done, be explicit about the trade-offs, and let anyone reproduce the work.
Data sources
Athletic finance data is sourced from NCAA Membership Financial Reports (MFRS) for the FY 2024-25 fiscal year, acquired through public records requests by Dr. Greg Chick (NILnomics). MFRS reports are filed annually with the NCAA by all D1 member institutions; public institutions' reports are subject to open records disclosure. Coverage of MFRS line-item detail is partial: 200 of 360 institutions in the dataset have full MFRS records; the remaining 160 have EADA universe-complete top-line totals only. Analyses that require MFRS line items (allocated/self-generated split, sport-bucket breakdown, head-coach concentration) operate on the 200-institution subset. The Coverage Gaps tab documents the institutional pattern — predominantly private institutions, plus a smaller remaining set of publics in specific states and conferences. For deeper sport-by-sport and NIL-era financial analysis, subscribe to NILnomics.
Universe-complete revenue and expense totals are supplemented from the U.S. Department of Education's Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act (EADA) database, which covers all Title IV institutions with intercollegiate athletics. Subdivision-level historical aggregates (FY 2005 onward) are from Knight Newhouse Data.
Institutional total revenue (for the Athletics' Share of the Institution view) is from IPEDS Finance FY 2023-24 — the most recent available, paired with FY 2024-25 athletic revenue. Specifically, F1A14 ("Total Revenues and Other Additions") is used for public institutions and F2I02 for private institutions. The one-year offset is structural to IPEDS' reporting cadence; institutional revenue typically grows under 5% year-over-year.
Structural-divide quadrant assignments are inherited from the parent Mapping the Structural Divide framework — built from IPEDS, College Scorecard, O*NET/Anthropic Economic Index, and WICHE data.
Methodology choices
Allocated revenue is the sum of Direct State Support (MFRS Item 2), Student Fees (Item 3), Direct Institutional Support (Item 4), and Indirect Institutional Support (Item 6) — the components of athletic revenue that come from the institution rather than from external sources. Generated revenue is everything else: ticket sales, donor contributions, media rights, conference distributions, NCAA distributions, royalties, and ancillary revenue. Self-generated revenue share = generated revenue ÷ total athletic revenue. High values indicate athletics is funded externally; low values indicate reliance on institutional allocation. This metric is sometimes called "subsidy ratio" in academic and policy literature; this site uses "allocated revenue share" to match standard athletic-finance reporting terminology (Knight Commission, NACDA, Sports Business Journal) and to avoid the connotations associated with "subsidy" on either side of the college-athletics conversation.
Sport attribution and the "football economy" framing. The MFRS reporting convention attributes revenue to a sport bucket only when it is directly generated by that sport's activity — ticket sales, guarantee games, bowl payouts, sport-specific donations. Conference media distributions, NCAA distributions, and unrestricted donor contributions are reported in a separate "non-sport-specific" category that this site groups under Other. The consequence is that the Football bucket in MFRS does not include the $40-70M SEC, Big Ten, or ACC media distributions that flow to member schools — even though those distributions exist because the school plays D1 football and would not exist otherwise. The familiar commentary that "football generates 80% of athletic revenue at P4 schools" reflects this broader football-economy attribution. Both framings are accurate descriptions of different quantities. The Football share alone at P4 averages 46.5%; adding Other (which captures the football-downstream conference, media, NCAA, and unrestricted donor flows) yields 88.1% across all P4 schools, roughly 89% at the top-20 P4 by revenue. On the expense side, the top-10 P4 by football revenue spend approximately 50% of football revenue on football operations — the remaining surplus is what funds the rest of the athletic department at elite programs. The older "65-70% comes back to football" figure reflects pre-megadeal economics (before SEC and Big Ten media contracts went vertical between 2014 and 2024) and is no longer descriptively accurate at the top of the sport.
Conference tier reflects FY 2024-25 status. Power Four: SEC, Big Ten, ACC, Big 12. Group of Five: AAC, Mountain West, MAC, Sun Belt, Conference USA, plus the (then-dormant) Pac-12. FCS-tier includes FCS football conferences plus non-football D1 conferences.
Football and basketball conferences are tracked separately for schools where they differ: Notre Dame (football Independent, ACC for other sports), UConn (AAC football, Big East basketball), the Pioneer Football League schools (football Pioneer, basketball in various conferences), and 22 other split-conference cases.
Athletics-as-percent of institutional revenue is computed where IPEDS institutional revenue is available. Institutions with hospital systems, research enterprises, or large medical centers in their reporting envelope (Penn State, Duke, Stanford, etc.) will show athletics as a small percentage of total — the metric is best interpreted as "athletics share of total institutional revenue," not "athletics share of academic operations."
Known limitations
The Coverage Gaps tab documents structural blind spots in the disclosure regime. Cross-source reconciliation between independent MFRS parses shows revenue figures bounded within approximately 2% and expense figures within approximately 20% — the wider expense band reflects per-school completeness gaps in third-party parsing pipelines, not a methodological dispute. Where multiple sources are available, the more complete value is used.
F1A14 vs F1A31 sensitivity: institutional revenue normalization uses F1A14 ("Total Revenues and Other Additions"). Robustness checks using F1A31 ("Total Revenues") produce similar relative rankings of schools, with absolute denominators differing by 5-15% per school based on which capital and non-operating items are included.
The FY 2024-25 dataset includes the first 15 institutional reports of NIL Revenue Share (Item 44) — Penn State, Oklahoma State, Louisville, Texas, and eleven smaller programs. This pre-dates the formal $20.5M revenue-sharing cap effective July 1, 2025, and reflects schools that moved early on revenue-sharing implementation.
Data & Downloads
The full dataset is available below in machine-readable form. Reuse is welcome with attribution under Creative Commons BY 4.0.
Downloads
The full v6 dataset — 360 D1 institutions with EADA universe-complete revenue and expense totals, conference assignments, and structural-divide quadrant, plus MFRS line-item detail (sport-level breakdown, allocated/self-generated split, head coach compensation) and IPEDS institutional normalization where available — is available below.
institutions.json — complete per-institution dataset (JSON, 417 KB)
institutions.csv — same data in CSV format (~99 KB), 360 rows × 35 columns
For replication, the data sources are listed on the Methods tab. The structural-divide framework is documented at Mapping the Structural Divide; the working paper is available there as well.
About
Where this site came from, who made it possible, what it draws on, and how to cite or contact.
Origin
The structural-divide framework I built for U.S. higher education at Mapping the Structural Divide made one set of patterns visible — institutional resilience, post-college market position, AI exposure — but it stopped at the academic edge of the institution. Athletics is a meaningful share of activity at hundreds of D1 programs. The framework couldn't ignore it indefinitely.
This site extends the parent framework to D1 athletics finance, using the same analytical scaffolding (the structural-divide quadrants), the same standard of methodological transparency (the standing limitations doc, the prominent disclosure of analytical choices, the citations anyone can verify), and the same insistence that the work be replicable from sources in the public record.
FY 2024-25 is the data vintage and the analytical anchor. That year sits in the gap between the October 2024 House v. NCAA settlement approval and the July 2025 effective date of the revenue-sharing cap. Some institutions started moving early — fifteen reported revenue-share-like figures on their FY 2024-25 books. Most played one more uncapped year. This dataset captures that transitional moment.
The collaborator
The athletic finance data — NCAA Membership Financial Reports for FY 2024-25 — was acquired through public records requests by Dr. Greg Chick, whose recently completed PhD dissertation built the scraping pipeline that makes this dataset possible. Greg runs NILnomics, a newsletter on college sports finance, which is also where his more granular sport-by-sport analysis lives. This site uses Greg's data with attribution and points readers to NILnomics for deeper drill-down. The division of labor: Greg's contribution is upstream (the public-records pipeline, the cleaned data), mine is downstream (the structural-divide framework, the analytical layering, the visualization design).
Intellectual lineage
The Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics has been documenting athletic finance for nearly four decades; the USA Today NCAA Finances database (built by Steve Berkowitz over twenty years) made institutional totals legible to a broader audience. The current generation of practitioner-journalists — Matt Brown at Extra Points, Daniel Libit at The Intercollegiate, Sportico's Eben Novy-Williams and Michael McCann, Front Office Sports's Amanda Christovich, Yahoo's Ross Dellenger, Darren Heitner's litigation tracking — keeps the conversation current, and direct exchanges with Mit Winter, Sam Ehrlich, and Eric Blevins on the legal and policy side helped me see what's actually there beneath the headlines. On the academic side, Andrew Zimbalist, Murray Sperber, Welch Suggs, and Ronald Smith wrote the history and the critique that frames the field; B. David Ridpath and Roger Pielke continue the scholarly groundwork on governance and finance that this project leans on directly. Mancur Olson's The Logic of Collective Action (1965) provides the theoretical backbone for understanding why college athletics looks like it does: every actor has individual incentives that make cooperative restraint individually irrational, and the resulting equilibrium — the coaching arms race, the institutionally-allocated cost centers, the disclosure gaps — emerges not from anyone's bad intentions but from the structure of the game.
What this site adds: the structural-divide overlay on athletic finance data. The four-bucket sport breakdown (men's football, men's basketball, women's basketball, and everything else) computed consistently across the D1 universe. The IPEDS normalization that surfaces athletics' share of institutional commitment. And — across all of it — the empirical anchor for the political-economy framing that animates the related public-facing writing at Sacred Cow BBQ.
Human-AI collaboration
This site was built in collaboration with Claude (Anthropic). Claude contributed substantially to the data pipeline, the cleaning and merging across MFRS / EADA / Knight Newhouse / IPEDS sources, the QC passes that caught real data integrity issues at multiple points (wrong UNITID assignments, school-specific pipeline gaps, methodology divergences between sources), the methodology decisions documented on the Methods page, the site code, and the drafting across many iterative sessions. The scope and speed of this work would not have been possible without that collaboration. The intellectual direction is mine — the decision to extend the structural-divide framework to athletics, the choice to use generated/allocated rather than subsidy vocabulary, the four-bucket sport categorization, the FY 2024-25-as-transitional-year framing, the cross-site integration with the parent framework. I directed and made decisions, we iterated, and Claude executed with rigor and patience.
The convention for crediting AI contributions in academic work is not yet settled. The standard I've adopted across this project is the same one as the parent framework: describe what the tool did, be honest about it, and take responsibility for the output.
Author
Kyle Saunders
Professor, Department of Political Science
Colorado State University
kyle.saunders@colostate.edu
kylesaunders.com · Sacred Cow BBQ · Google Scholar
How to cite
Saunders, K. (2026). Mapping College Athletics: D1 Athletic Finance in the Year Between House and the Cap. Data via Dr. Greg Chick (NILnomics). Working Paper, Colorado State University. https://kylesaunders.com/athletics-map
Acknowledgments
Greg Chick for the data pipeline, the patience in answering my questions about its quirks, and his ongoing work at NILnomics. Reviewers and readers who pushed back on early framings. I'll add to this list as the project moves forward.
Updates
This site is built as a living dataset. The current snapshot uses FY 2024-25 athletic finance data — the transitional year between House settlement approval and the revenue-sharing cap. Updates will land as new data becomes available.
Update cadence
Annual fiscal year refresh. New NCAA Membership Financial Reports for D1 public institutions are typically filed and released by early-to-mid in the following calendar year. When FY 2025-26 reports land — likely fall 2026 through early 2027 — the dataset will refresh and a new version will go live. FY 2025-26 will be especially consequential as the first year of the revenue-sharing cap, and that comparison (FY 25 vs FY 26) will be a feature of the v2 release.
Coverage-gap closures. A handful of FY 2024-25 cases remain dark by structure (UCF's associated-entity workaround; Pittsburgh's state exemption; Army and Air Force on federal-institution reporting cadence). Where coverage opens — Alabama and Florida on 2026-05-21; an additional 39 publics plus Southeastern Louisiana, UC Santa Barbara, FIU, and Navy on 2026-05-28; North Florida, Idaho State, New Hampshire, and Arkansas-Little Rock on 2026-06-02 — the change is noted in the version-history line below without bumping the major version.
Methodology refinements. Where future data work refines the analytical framework — additional IPEDS variables, longitudinal panels, NIL-collective tracking, etc. — the change will be documented here with a versioned note. The structural-divide framework on Mapping the Structural Divide is the parent reference; changes there sync automatically.
Version history
v1.0 — initial release. FY 2024-25 athletics finance data for 360 D1 institutions (EADA universe-complete for revenue and expense; MFRS line-item detail for 200); four-bucket sport breakdown (MFB, MBB, WBB, Other) where MFRS available; FY 2023-24 IPEDS institutional revenue for normalization; conference assignments with football/basketball split where they differ; structural-divide quadrant overlay from the parent framework. Coverage refresh 2026-05-21: Alabama and Florida sport-level breakdowns and reconciled totals backfilled from FY2024-25 MFRS PDFs obtained directly from the institutions. Coverage refresh 2026-05-28: 39 additional public-D1 schools (Big West Cal States, MEAC, SWAC remainder, Big Sky, OVC, Horizon, others) backfilled with sport-level breakdowns from an expanded MFRS pipeline; Southeastern Louisiana and UC Santa Barbara closed from EADA-only to full MFRS; FIU and the U.S. Naval Academy added as new records (bringing the dataset to 360). Sport-bucket subset rose from 149 to 164 football-fielding schools. Coverage refresh 2026-06-02: North Florida, Idaho State, New Hampshire, and Arkansas-Little Rock closed from EADA-only to full MFRS, bringing the MFRS subset to 200.